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MEANING UNDER THE THREAT OF PARADOX 
ON TWO FRONTS
The Resemblance Paradox
The paradox threatening the understanding of linguistic meaning in terms 
of ‘family resemblance’ refers to the open character of meaning that de-
rives from it, or what has been called the ‘under-determination paradox’. 
If all that is needed to belong to the extension of a concept is some kind 
of resemblance or overlapping of arbitrary features with any of its already 
existing members (with possibly new members resembling the immediately 
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preceding features introduced, and so forth), then ultimately anything could 
end up belonging to it.1 So, if the family resemblance model was supposed 
to free us from a too rigid and fixed conception of meaning, now it appears 
to allow for the dilution of meaning altogether.
Since the beginning of the debate, there has also been an issue concern-
ing the generality of the family resemblance claim: whether Wittgenstein 
considered it to apply to some specific kind of concepts only (keeping talk of 
common features for others), or whether it was intended as a general claim. 
Opinions diverge2 regarding the textual evidence and whether it allows one 
thing or the other to be attributed to Wittgenstein. The way this question 
is settled will, of course, affect the extent of the threat upon the concept of 
meaning we see the paradox has. 
Wittgenstein first introduced the metaphor of family resemblance 
in The Blue Book (1958, p. 17), expounding on it later in his Philosophical 
Investigations (1953, p. 65). The concept was intended to question the tra-
ditional account according to which the meaning of our words is dependent 
upon certain necessary and sufficient conditions, and to depict it instead 
as some ‘crisscrossing of similarities’ between the extension members of 
our terms. However, the reason why speaking of necessary and sufficient 
conditions did not fit well with Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning is 
best grasped, in my opinion, from the perspective of his ‘Rule-Following 
Considerations’, since the claim that no rule is given in advance for the use 
of a concept is tantamount to the idea that we cannot pin meaning down to 
a set of fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. Wittgenstein’s picture of 
‘Rules as Rails’ (1953, §218, §219) attempted to make clear precisely that 
there is no possible understanding of meaning that could predict how we 
might have to adapt our concepts in light of an unpredictable reality, nor 
a pre-given reality demanding a given sort of classification in advance. Mean-
ing is not a once-and-for-all concluded issue but a continuously reassessed 








  3 In what follows I will take as base line of my perspective the argumentation line 
introduced by Dummett (1978) and specially developed by Wright in several texts on 
the matter (1984, 2001, 2007). Although that doesn’t mean that I would underwrite all 
their arguments, but rather, that I support in general terms the approach and will often 
be referring to it while adding some insights of my own.
See, for example, Wennerberg (1967, pp. 116–117) as quoted by Belleimey (1990). 
Against the generalisation, for example, Sluga (2006), Williamson (1994).
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continuous human evaluation to determine whether certain new cases are 
to count as members of a conceptual extension or not – or to put it another 
way, ‘whether they sufficiently resemble what we have so far considered as 
cases of such’ – and, similarly, that there are no fixed conditions to determine 
this. Therefore, how far or in what direction we might proceed is an open 
issue here too. But, can we assimilate both questions?
A paradox on two fronts 
Actually, I believe that the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP), elaborated by 
Kripke (1982), points to the same under-determination problem threatening 
the idea of family resemblance but from a different perspective. If anything 
could pertain to the extension of a concept from the one side, from the other 
the concept or the rule that guides its use can be made to cohere with any-
thing. So, here we have a paradox from two sides. Now, if this is right, and 
if the RFP is taken to be a general one (or we should refute the paradox as 
a whole), why is it that many authors deny the Resemblance Paradox (RP) 
a parallel generality?
Consider claims 1, 2 and 3 below. Claims 1 (RFP) and 2 are obviously 
reversible. So, have I incurred any non-allowed assumption in asserting that 
therefore, since 3 (RP) is a case of 2, then the RFP and RP are two sides of 
the same paradox?
(1) Any course of action, or sequence of applications, can be made to 
cohere with the rule. 
(2) The rule, or concept, can be made to cohere with any course of 
action or sequence of applications.
(3) The family of resemblances of a concept can end up including 
anything.
The trouble appears to stem from the introduction of ‘resemblances’ as 
setting the standard of what can be included under a concept and then reading 
the ‘coherence with any course of action’ in terms of possible ‘resemblances 
with anything’ (any new potential instance considered or considerable).
We can make the transition from 2 to 3 plainer by reformulating 
3 into 3*:
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(3)*  The rule or concept can be made to cohere with any course of ac-
tion, because resemblances can be found with any further moves 
that might be made. 
So, has some objectionable modification been introduced through this 
move? The perspectives are, first of all, different. The reasons why ‘the rule 
might expand to any course of action’ in 1, are left unanalysed; it is as though 
we were thinking in terms of possible descriptive rules, rules that can be 
reconstructed differently or be seen as having been understood differently 
by the speaker all the way through each time a new move is made, whatever 
that is. When we talk about resemblances, though, we are moving at the level 
of the members of the extension, or referential level and, further, in terms of 
the ‘likeness’ they bear of each other; as though we would have no problem 
in understanding the concept or rule, or would take it to be fixed and then try 
to see how well new candidates fulfil it through the process of comparing 
them ‘in likeness’ with previous members of the extension. That is, in 1 it 
is the rule that would not be clear but would need to be determined through, 
or at least compatible with, the ongoing sequence of moves; here, we get the 
impression that it would be the other way around. But the difference is only 
apparent, since both aspects cannot be separated from each other. We cannot 
consider the rule as fixed in the second case, precisely because depending on 
which candidates are seen as fit to be included each time will be understood 
one way or another (and even then, not once-and-for-all); and that is precisely 
what is said by 1. On the other hand, the decision on which candidates are 
to be included is, for its part, dependent on the various possible ways of 
understanding the rule. However, we might insist on the point about the 
legitimacy of new moves being determined specifically by resemblance, 
which some might argue need not be read into the RFP. 
The RFP differs from this point of view insofar as the various moves 
that might and can be made to cohere with the rule need to have nothing 
to do with resemblance but rather with differently motivated decisions, as 
in the case of mathematics. The members of a mathematical sequence can-
not be properly seen as ‘resembling’ each other. But is this so? If we take 
a look at some of Kripke’s (1982, p. 58) examples to start with, such as the 
colour ‘grue’, it would appear that if, after a series of greens, the speaker 
is inclined also to include blues and further yellowish things (I am modify-
ing the example for my purposes), the point might be put in terms of ‘what 
similarities’ she takes to be relevant. She may have seen a similarity in them 
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all in the sense that they resemble ‘the colours of a famous folk ceramic’ or 
some other possibility of the sort (the different instances resembling each 
other or others already included),4 since from this perspective they could 
be claimed to ‘resemble’ each other if not in a strictly perceptual sense then 
through them having some traceable common connection. But even when 
talking about mathematical sequences, it can be claimed that different moves 
‘resemble’ each other in the sense that some likeness can be discovered in 
them all (so far) owing to some possible compatible function, be that what 
it may. We could consider the numbers in a sequence and find several pos-
sible functions that could make them alike. That much they would have in 
common. Remember that saying that there are no necessary and sufficient 
conditions goes along with the idea that there is no once-and-for-all pre-
determined rule; and precisely for that reason, seen from the other side the 
‘likeness’ or connections that can be found between members of the exten-
sion and new ones is not defined either and allows for different reconstruc-
tions. Furthermore, two instances might be alike in expressing a (+2) relation 
while others express a (×4) etc., and out of these different ‘likenesses’ we 
could reconstruct one possible complex rule among others. If we insist that 
the rule is a determinate one, then the same would go for the likeness. But if 
we claim that we cannot commit ourselves to there being a fixed rule, then 
the matter of likeness remains open too. 
What appears to be hindering the identification of both problems is that 
when we talk of ‘family resemblance’, even knowing that the expression 
is metaphorical we tend to visualise the problem on a perceptual-like level, 
registering some sort of undetermined likeness between already existing 
cases and new ones. Therefore, in expanding the rule it all appears to be 
a matter of finding any such similarities. But the idea that in our rule we 
should include similar and apparently dissimilar instances, such as from 
oranges to apples as could potentially be the case (the fact that up until now 
we have only encountered apples does not mean that the rule might not apply 
to oranges too), appears to put us in a different place from the problem of 
resemblance. But that is only because we are expecting the similarities to 
4 Note that it does not help to say, but ‘they are these specific Folk ceramic colours 
and those are necessary and sufficient conditions’, since that would be the same as say-
ing, but it is a ‘Family Wittgenstein resemblance’ that is the necessary and sufficient 
condition they have in common. 
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follow the metaphor too literally while the user might be moving at a much 
more abstract level in which aspects beyond form, colour or taste are con-
sidered. The resemblance might indeed be found to concern such aspects or 
might lie, for example, in ‘playing a similar pragmatic role in our nutrition’ 
or ‘provoking the same kind of reaction’ (being disgusting, for example), 
and so on. On the other hand, resemblances that allow the speaker to include 
new members in the extension of the concepts, whatever and how varied 
these are, will, from the reconstructive perspective of a hearer, be turned 
into whatever number of rules can make sense of the whole sequence so far. 
Thus, as far as it goes, I see no reason to resist the identification of both 
paradoxes as being the same one from two perspectives; and if generality 
should be attributable to one, the same, it seems to me, should go for the other.
The Paradox Again
So far, we have not made the prospects of a satisfactory conception of 
meaning better exactly but have simply argued that the threat that was seen 
to come from two sides is actually the same threat. A threat, nevertheless, 
though. But how bad is it, and how corrosive are the arguments in genuinely 
undermining our linguistic confidence? 
As I see it, the main issue with the rule-following paradox is not most 
importantly, as Kripke (1982, pp. 96–97) puts it, that we should not be able 
to appeal to any fact of the matter, either in our mind or from past behaviour, 
that determines which rule it is that we are following. Rather, it is that there 
are no facts of the matter about it being a determinate rule because there can-
not be any once-and-for-all rules fixed in advance, either for the individual 
or the community. There would be nothing like linguistic normativity in that 
sense. In this point I go along with Wright’s (1984) interpretation, although 
I will not be appealing to the question of intentionality that is central to 
Wright’s paper5. So, going back to our problem, we can distinguish various 
claims made by the RFP: (1) the impossibility of predicting decisions about 
the future application of a term; and (2) the idea that we cannot say what rule 
we are following and, therefore, that there is no specific meaning we can be 
said to attach to our terms. The question is whether the step that brings us 
5 For example, p. 776.
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from (1) to (2) is to be seen as compelling – whether we want to say a) that 
because it is impossible for us to predict all future applications, we cannot 
say what rule we are following nor attach any meaning to our words; or 
b) that we could not even say, for independent reasons, what rule we have 
been following or what we mean by the term, diluting any possible meaning 
contour. If we mean a), I would say that this is partially right. However, it 
should be given a qualified reading and surely not one that allows us to as-
sert the second part of it, i.e. that for that reason there would be no meaning 
we can be said to have attached to our terms, since there is still room for an 
evolving and open-ended conception of meaning to which I will come in 
a moment. But if we mean b), that it is not just because of differing evolving 
possibilities that we cannot be said to know what we have been doing up 
to now (since we could not pin down normativity itself to any kind of fact, 
just as we cannot in reality – the Hume’s problem of induction, causality 
etc. as Kripke argues – not in our mind, etc.), nor because of any specific 
meaning we have been implementing, then the claim is questionable, not in 
the sense that there should in our mental life or behaviour be the normativ-
ity that Kripke denies but in the sense that we nevertheless know what we 
have been doing. 
The first claim above, (1), is compatible with the following situation 
(again modifying similar examples6): I have been walking through the street 
lights at green and not at red in a finite set of cases, but one day I stop, 
puzzled and wondering when suddenly the street lights are purplish rather 
than red, not knowing whether to cross the street or not. Does it mean that 
I did not know what I was doing before? The authorities then realise that 
these new intelligent street lights vary their colour (as in a programme that 
appears to be affected by the pollution level in the street), now projecting 
a rather purplish light at certain times of the day in some parts of the city. 
Instead of changing the whole system, they might adapt the rule to make us 
pedestrians stop at purplish lights too. Does that mean that I had no guide-
lines before or that my rule could just as well have been ‘red and purplish 
when pollution is over 50%’, and that I could not tell which since I could not 
have said that such a progression could not be? We would rather say in the 
sense of 1) that my rule has evolved and adapted in light of an unforeseen 
6  
 
 The example can be seen again as a different variation of Goodman (1983) and 
Kripke’s (1984) ‘grue emeralds’ example.
12 Olga Ramírez Calle
reality. Insisting on the question, ‘But were you then following the red/green 
rule or the red-purplish/green rule before (you could have)?’ is in no way 
unsettling, unless there was some external standard already possessed by 
someone that could have specified in advance that it was the red-purplish 
one I was already supposed to be following but I had simply not gone that 






     
  
         
 






   
 
  
            
          
               
                 
        
 
  
          
             
               
  
     
      
      
    
   
    
    
        
         
         
       
      
         
             
     
             
               
               
             
              
              
           
                 
                
            
           
          
           
          
           
             
            
             
               
               
            
We can agree that there is nothing like a once-and-for-all account of 
meaning for that reason, but that does not mean that anything goes either. It is 
the further idea, that anything can be made to cohere with the rule, that should 
be reconsidered. It is the same with the idea that there could be resemblances 
all the way through. That a similar issue might be raised with blue, pink, 
etc. street lights and that in all cases we might have decided favourably to 
recognise them as members (to be included as those by which pedestrians are 
to stop too), does not mean that our rule was in a strict sense already any of 
them but just that it might have evolved into any of them ‘if we should have 
so decided’. Virtuality is far from being reality for rules too. Furthermore, 
the rule could never have evolved into ‘going through green’ since green was 
explicitly excluded as ‘Not-Red’, implying fixing a necessary and su!cient 
condition for exclusion.7That there should be vague cases that require further 
decisions (whether something really is green, for example) does not 
undermine there being clear lines about standard prototype ones. Finally, 
should life take a perverse turn and we come to reverse the rule and allow 
pedestrians to proceed through red (which would require fixing green as 
the opposite), we would need to start talking about following a new 
(inverse) rule. This is because clearly if right and wrong mingle, then no 
talk of the same rule makes sense anymore. But it would be absurd to say 
that the rule I followed was, ‘going through green or red’ as well as ‘going 
through green only’.
              
             
                 
         
             
              
             
                 
         
             
 Timothy Williamson argued in his book Vagueness (1994) that the problem of the 
underdetermination of meaning, could be resolved by appealing to negative resemblances, 
while he still pretends to avoid any talk of necessary conditions. I think the direction 
is right, but as a whole the proposal is not in the sense that we do need opposition, 
but no opposition can be obtained in my view without precisely fixing at least some 
criteria for exclusion.
              
             
                 
         
             
 So, again, in the sense of a) neither the individual nor the community 
can determine which rule it is, seen from the perspective of upcoming futures 
that might turn what we now call ‘a’, into any number of ‘a1’, ‘a2’, ‘a3’, …, ‘an’ 
(different in themselves, since allowing and forbidding different instances). 
But whichever rule appears to be displayed in the future and then again in
7
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the thereafter following the future, it must conform with the set of cases that 
have been accepted up until now and be incompatible with those that have 
been excluded as ‘not-a’8; which is actually already quite significant since 
it amounts to excluding from the rule to be (if you wish, or better to say 
‘become’) a good amount of possibilities, call them ‘a–1’, ‘a–2’, ‘a–3’, …,‘a–n’. 
I would expect my training situation to have made me go through not just 
positive cases of inclusion but also the most relevant ones to be excluded. 
Nor should these be arbitrary, but rather their exclusion made dependent 
upon specific aspects; that is, we should be given reasons for it, ultimately 
pinned down to some salient features that are supposed to be relevant. 
Surely, as Kripke stresses, the point is supposed to be that whatever 
reasons we give they should be given in linguistic terms, and for each of 
these terms the problem again arises of what exactly is the meaning or rule 
to which we are supposed to be referring. Being drawn ultimately to a level 
where no language is available, we would simply deal just with performance. 
But we might also argue that at basic levels we pin terms down to basic, 
unidimensional, easily recognisable properties with clear opposing contraries 
‘hot/not hot (cold)’, ‘full/not full (empty)’ etc.9 For such concepts, up to 
a certain point, it would be easier to determine whether the corresponding 
property is lacked or possessed (vagueness aside). But if this is right, and 
if such characteristics are components of complex concepts, then excluded 
cases can be justified on the basis of the presence or absence of those and 
we can be made aware of it. 
Therefore, I can consider myself safe to go on matching standardly 
similar cases to those in my past application history, leaving aside others 
banned in already experienced situations. Thereby relying on our basic ca-
pacity to distinguish cases significantly reiterating marked features in our 
memory of those already had,10 from not matching ones.11 Since, should any 
apparently non-significant dissimilarities among them have knowingly been 
relevant or confusing in advance, I would have been provided some such 
8 Compare with the discussion of Williamson’s position in Ramirez (2020, pp. 16–20).
9 Ibidem.
10 Such standard cases do not pose us for a decision whether to implement our pattern 
further, as will be the case by more diverging or novel ones, since such a decision is in 
a sense already made and is now a matter of course.
11 Compare with the idea of a pattern in Ramírez (2020, p. 10, and the previous 
discussion in pp. 8–9).
14 Olga Ramírez Calle
reason for their exclusion (drawn down to non-linguistically cognitively 
apprehensible ones, if necessary). I would, namely, have been advised of it 
soon enough in my training. Had decisions in this regard not already been 
made by my community, it would be meaningless to say that because such 
cases might be added or refused in a future time, t2, my rule is already a dif-
















             
            
              
              
           
            
        
          
           
         
             
             
             














             
             
          
              
           
            
             
               
           
           
            
            
           
         
            
          
  
       
      
       
       
      
      
 
     
      
     
       
       

















           
           
             
               
         
           
       
      
          
          
       
          
          
             
          
             
               
           
              
            
            
             
               
            
           
             
             
           
         
            
          
  
            
             
           
             
           
           
             
               
            
           
             
             
           
         
            
          
  
                
              
          
           
               
               
           
               
            
        
             
           
           
          
            
          
           
        
             
           
















             
          
          
        
          
          
              
         
            
             
             
   
This might not solve the issue for good, 12of course, who knows whether a 
triple assemble of a gender mixed character will knock someday at the 
door wanting to sanctify their union and reclaiming the word ‘marriage’ 
for themselves. Or whether some future genetical combinatory procedure 
results in beings not contemplated in today’s legal systems, but with a 
similar desire to be bind themselves through ‘marriage’ for the eyes and 
legal recognition of all. Should their union, in this or the previous case, be 
included as marriage on several occasions, coherence (vagueness aside) 
will demand to include standard prototype cases of such to be included 
too from now on. Otherwise, again, we will need to find exclusion reasons 
for the non-admitted cases, which users should be made aware of. Was the 
linguistic rule of ‘marriage’ from the  beginning on to  include  heterosexual
 But if by non-standard cases this picture relies ultimately on the deci- 
sions, as I above said, made by my community (and here I side again with 
antirealist readings of Wittgenstein) a worry might be raised on whether 
the community will have to be meeting whenever any of us has a problem 
of non-familiar application. But the fact is, that when such problems are 
relevant for whichever pragmatic reason, that is precisely what we do: ask 
others whether there are already laid down criteria or, otherwise, try to find 
together some in order to fix the line one way or the other. Meanwhile, we 
help each other by appeal to a history of commonly recorded application. 
Should same sex couples start wanting to call themselves Ô marriageÕ  and 
others finding it a transgression of use, the matter will be solved through 
a legal decision to avoid further discussion. Not because both could not have 
been an option from the perspective of past application and considerable 
resemblance, but because (among other implications of the institution 
that go along with the term) we must lay ourselves down to 
communicate, based surely too on independent reasons of social relevance.
15Meaning under the threat of paradox on two fronts






















 Wright (2002, p. 10) points out that this point about decision is stressed by Witt- 
genstein himself in Philosophical Investigations (1953) although Wittgenstein notices 
that this amounts to acknowledging the absence of real constraints.
             
           
            
              
           
             
               
              
               
               
                
               
              
                
                  
              
            
        
              
              
              
               
          
      
         
        
      
    
   
      
      
      
       
     
              
               
             
            
               
              
             
         
             
           
            
              
           
             
               
              
               
               
                
               
              
                
                  
              
            
        
Is this appeal to the community to be put together with Kripke’s skepti- 
cal solution? I do not think it should. First of all, maybe, because my reading 
might alter the problem as Kripke sees it. Second, because the point here 
is not that there should be nothing constraining our behaviour. There is. 
Not in the sense of there being any fact of the matter, that the rules 
constitute; in fact, at the personal level I tend to think that what takes 
place is something more alike, as above said, to sorting out matching and 
non-matching cases, without what can be considered a constraining 
normativity.14
couples and from a given moment on heterosexual and homosexual ones 
and then again triples or semi-human creatures? Well, yes and no, if 
you wish. It simply wasn’t definitively fixed one way or the other. The 
normativity of the rule was no self-runner, no necessity mechanism that 
implements itself on its own as Wittgenstein argued. From the perspective 
of the future it was the same one, since it is the same rule or term that has 
evolved, including all past cases and from a given moment on new ones. 
Could the user or the community have appealed to any fact of the matter to 
say that the rule necessarily must have excluded homosexual ones? No, the 
fact that it had not done so, so far, didn’t mean it could not have so evolved. 
Did it mean that they did not know what they have so far being doing in 
using the word? Of course not, either. So, if the worry is, how is it that the 
community can embody normativity any better, if the paradox affects it too, 
if it need not know any better which rule it will be. The answer is, as Wright 
puts it, that the point here is not one about knowing, but about deciding 
13on the face of hard cases which way to go. This amount from my 
perspective to giving grounds for exclusion and appealing to a precedent 
history to solve further queries.
 I thank an anonymous referee of Analiza i Egzystenzja for some clarifications on 
options available here.














14 Compare Ramírez (2020, p. 8).
        
  
 
    
 
        
 
       
 
          
          
             
           
             
                
                
             
               
             
           
 
The rule is precisely what results out of the over and over enacted 
decisions of the community together with the resulting divide in accepted 
and rejected pat- terns whose impression in our memories traces a path. The 
rule could surely become as many a1, a 2,a3…a nas you wish, but, so far it 
cannot be said to be any of them unless we so determine, and I might even 
know already that some possible paths aren’t my rule at all. The reason 
why the community agrees is no casualty here, it is because it has set the 
terms and will decide them further. This seems to me a good enough 
solution to restore meaning confidence. But a solution, maybe, to a 
different problem.
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MEANING UNDER THE THREAT OF PARADOX ON TWO FRONTS
Summary
The paper defends the argument that the Resemblance Paradox (RP), or the problem 
of the ‘under-determination of meaning’, and the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP) are 
two sides of the same paradox threatening meaning from opposite extremes. After 
presenting the case, the paradox is reconsidered anew and the supposition that the 
threat is a pervasive one is challenged.
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